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.. PRESENT AND FUTURI; NATIONAL OBJECTIVES 
An · Address delivered by 
Bernard M. Baruch 
at the Naval · War College 
March 31, 1950 
Admiral Beary has asked me to talk to you on the subject 
of strategy. I certainly ani not equipped to discuss strategy as it 
relates to specific weapons or to the role of the different services 
or even to the. military importance of the atomic bomb. Since 
World War One, however, I have studied the inter-relationships of 
war and peace and some of my thoughts in this regard may in­
terest you. 
A . little more than a year ago, one member of the Senate 
Arm�d Services Committe� came to me in great agitation. He had 
heard that a defense budget of $30 billions was being prepared 
and he was frightened at what it would do to our economy. He 
asked my advice as to what policy should be followed in the matter 
of defense expenditures fo� the cold war; 
My reply was that we had to avoid panicky over-spending. 
- Instead we had to learn to pace ourselves in relation to the Russians
and the threat of war. We dared not over-spend on armaments to
where .our social, political and ·economic system might be wrecked
-that would suit the enemy as much as to defeat us militarily. Yet
we dared not maintain so feeble a defense establishment as to in­
vite aggression, as it did in Hitler's time.
With each 8'ear· of added cold war attrition, this concept of 
"pacing ourselves" · becomes more vital:- and also more difficult 
to carry out. The longer the cold_ war drags, the more essential it 
Mr. Baruch, el<ler statesman, financier and philanthropist, was Chair­
man of the War Industries Board in World War I. During World 
War II, he servjld as adviser to President Roosevelt and War 
Mobilization Director James H. Byrnes. 
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becomes to husband our resources, yet the greater grows the 
danger that the cold war may erupt into a hot, shooting war. In 
the past few years, while the whole world has been digging itself 
out from under the destruction and exhaustion of the last war, no 
potential aggressor has had the material means for waging another 
war. But what will happen when the potential aggressor has re­
covered his strength and there still is no peace? 
Now by "pacing ourselves" I do not mean that we should 
undertake to match Soviet armament, plane by plane, tank by tank, 
man for man. On that I am completely in accord with General 
Omar Bradley. However, I do feel that we must vigilantly watch 
the over-all degree of Soviet mobilization for war and that we 
· dare not permit too great a variance with our own mobilization­
or we risk war.
By "pacing ourselves" I also mean that we must preserve a 
flexible attitude· towards our problems of defense and not freeze 
rigidly on too narrow a strategy. For example, I would not think 
it wise to base our defense exclusively on our ability to retaliate 
against the enemy's cities and industries. To prevent aggression, 
it is true that we must be able to retaliate instantly and that the 
enemy should know we can do it. Still, I am not sure that the 
"next war" -May it never come-will begin with flagrant open at­
tack upon this country. It seems to me quite likely that the test 
may come in the more subtle form of civil war-probably. in Ger­
many. In event of such a civil war, the situation might be such 
that it would be unwise to retaliate against the enemy directly and 
yet we would not dare stand by impotent. 
In short, I believe our defensive strategy must not only an­
ticipate the danger of another all-out war, but that of civil war as 
well. 
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As a matter of fact, it might be said this state of civil war 
already exists, that that is what the cold war really is, neither peace 
nor total war, but a succession of civil conflicts, more or less violent, 
wherever the Soviets can foment such strife. In Western Europe 
we have managed to achieve a sufficient degree of stability to pre­
vent open civil war. In Greece, after a bloody and costly struggle, 
the civil war appears to have been decided in the favor of the dem­
ocracies. In China we have suffered a truly serious defeat. 
That defeat has stirred a good deal of public discussion of 
whether we are losing the cold war. Certainly there is sufficient 
reason to feel that what has been done so far is inadequate. 
A few weeks ago, the Secretary of State called for "total 
diplomacy". Undoubtedly that is what is needed. Undoubtedly 
that is not what we have. 
Although the cold war is now dragging into its sixth year 
and despite the enormous resources we have expended, we still 
have not faced up to what the total peace-waging requires. We 
still stagger from crisis to crisis, with the initiative left to the 
enemy. We still treat each country as a separate problem, in­
stead of as part of a unified global strategy. 
For several years, now, I have been pressing, both publicly 
and privately, for this over-all global strategy, which would do for 
the peacemaking what our global strategy did during the recent 
war. To devise this global strategy I have urged that a central 
"think body" be created, to survey the whole of the cold war, re­
examining our policy and advising the President. 
Recently my good friend Senator Vandenberg proposed a 
somewhat similar group. I arri afraid, though, that the re-evalua­
tion of American policy he proposes would not go far enough­
his letter talks only of political and economic policy. Then, I do 
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not believe that a special committee, which would study the prob­
lems of ECA, report and then disband, is enough. What is needed 
is a non-partisan gr<Yu.p which will stay on the job until the cold 
war is won, a group which would sit in continuous deliberation on 
the whole of the peace-waging, serving as a central point of de­
cision, weighing all the many commitments pressed upon us, guid­
ing the best disposition of our strained resources, determining 
where in the world we are to fight a more holding action and where 
we can achieve a decisive break-through-and at what effort. 
In short,. what is needed is a General Staff for Peace. 
To cite only one instance of the sort of decisions now going 
by default-take Indo China. For tranquility to be restored to that 
Asian outpost the civil war now raging there will have to be brought 
to a victorious conclusion. Where are the French to obtain the 
necessary military supplies? It has been suggested that the French 
government use the materiel now being allocated to it under the 
Military Aid Program. But the aim of that Military Aid Program 
was to strengthen Western Eur-9pe against possible Soviet ag­
gression. Are we then to weaken Western Europe for some half-
hearted and possibly ineffective action in the Orient? 
Sooner or later we must expect a showdown over Germany­
since Germany cannot be expected to remain divided indefinitely. 
Are we pacing ourselves so that we will be ready for that show­
down when it comes ? Or will it find us as unprepared as we now 
seem to be to deal with conditions in the Far East? 
Are we to continue to spread ourselves too thin, unable to 
achieve decision anywhere? Hasn't the time come for the expen­
diture of sufficient resources to force a decision somewhere? 
If our diplomacy is to be truly "total", we must mobilize 
not only public opinion but the necessary economic, military and 
4 
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political resources, applying those resources on the basis of an over­
all global strategy. That is not now being done. I doubt that it 
will be done unless some central peacemaking agency is created. 
I began urging.the formation of such a GHQ for Peace even 
before the last war ended. In memoranda to President Roosevelt 
I pointed out that America's greatest power in the peacemaking 
would lie in the fact that we would emerge from the war with our· 
enormou� productive power untouched by devastation. No country, 
in the world would be, able to raise its living standards without 
American help. Our problem would be how to bring this great 
productive power to bear upon the peacemaking as decisively as 
we had done in the warmaking. 
I proposed to President Roosevelt that an Advisory · Peace 
Council be created consisting, of the secretaries of State, War, 
Navy, Treasury, the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion, 
the Foreign Economic · Administrator and Harry Hopkins. This 
body was to consider all peace questions, formulating their recom­
mendations for policy, which were to go to the President for his 
final decision. This Council was also to have a small staff of its 
own under the direction of a Counsellor who enjoyed the complete 
personal confidence of the President. 
Roosevelt lik_ed the idea and said he would put it into effect. 
He told me he would name James F. Byrnes as its chairman and 
Judge Samuel Rosenman, as the Counsellor. Judge Rosenman was 
then in Europe and the President put off establishing the Council 
until Rosenman should return. Shortly after that, President 
Roosevelt sent me to London to discuss some matters with Winston 
Churchill and while there I told Judge Rosenman about the Presi­
dent's plan. A few days later we received the tragic news that the 
President had died. 
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When I returned from London, I repeated the suggestion for 
this peace council to President Truman and he said he would create 
the body. But the idea got shunted off. 
"Possibly the reason was the creation of the National Secur­
ity Council, which, I was told, was modelled upon the earlier sug­
gestion of an Advisory Peace Council to the President. Unfortunate­
ly if that is what the Security Council was intended to be, it hasn't 
wor}ced out that way. The members of the Security Council are over­
worked; its membership needs broadening; its functioning must be 
reorganized to come to grips with the problems of achieving a de­
cision in the peacemaking, instead of avoiding decision as has hap­
pened too often in the past. 
A revitalized Security Council could do the job but it would 
have to be brought under the direction of a man of the stature of 
General Marshall, and enlarged with men who have no other busi­
ness but this. To win the cold war, there must be one group which 
does nothing but think, work, plan-live and breathe-the cold war. 
The first task of this revitalized Security Council might well 
be to re-examine the whole situation to determine what would be 
required to win the cold war and to plan a step-by-step strategy for 
taking the initiative in gaining peace. Were that done, by the sort 
of body I envision, I believe its recommendations would command 
the support of the public and Congress. 
Without such a central peacemaking agency "total diplo­
macy" will remain a mere phrase. 
If the American people are told what must be done, honestly 
and frankly, they will see the peace through. On the other hand, 
if the tactics adopted are to lure them into ever deeper involvement, 
bit by bit, without ever facing up to what the total peacemaking re­
quires, then there will always be doubt of their willingness to drift 
down a road which has no end. 
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While this General Staff for Peace is our first need, it is not 
our only need. For such a body to function effectively, it must 
have the best possible intelligence. How are we to pace ourselves in 
relation to the Russians unless we know what they are up to? 
It is not easy to figure the Russians out. Still, I am not 
prepared to accept the viewpoint of Russia as an unfathomable en­
igma behind an impenetrable iron curtain. Certain factors about 
the _Soviet Government should make it quite predictable. 
As Dictators, the Soviet leaders can act without consulting 
their people and are therefore capable of unloosing surprises. But 
the Soviet Union is also a planned economy. Everything that hap­
pens in Russia is supposed to measure up·to a Five Year Plan, which, 
in turn, is broken down into yearly plans. The Plan doesn't always 
work out in practice. Still it must reflect the judgments, decisions 
-and motives--0f the Soviet leaders.
The Kremlin's calculations as to when war is likely-twenty, 
ten, five, two years from now, or even sooner�must be embodied in 
Soviet planning, in how critically short materials are divided be­
tween immediate military needs and the expansion of Soviet in­
dustry, in the rate of purchases abroad of materials the Soviets 
lack at home and so on. 
Russia. being a dictatorship, none of these things can hap­
pen accidentally. Each action must reflect some decision taken in 
the Kremlin. Each action reflects some caluculated risk which the 
Soviet government is taking. By putting together all of the bits 
and pieces, we should have an adequate basis for judging Russia'i:; 
intentions as to war or peace. 
Studying the Soviet economy in this w:ay should also give us 
some means of checking the extravagant reports current as to Rus., 
sia's military strength. One day these reports picture the Soviet 
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Union building a gigantic air force; then it is a terrific fleet of sub­
marines; then it is tanks, and ground forces; then it is a navy. But 
Russia can hardly be a great land power, a great naval power, a 
great air power, a great atomic power, all at the same time. We 
know how difficult and expensive it is for this country to maintain 
our defense establishment and Russia has infinitely less resources at 
her command than we do. 
In the course of "pacing ourselves" we are always likely to 
lag somewhat behind the Soviets in terms of readied military 
· strength. In itself this is not necessarily alarming since our enor­
mous potential for war also serves as a deterrent against aggression.
If overt Soviet aggression }}as been prevented these last few years,
it has not been solely because of our possession of the atomic bomb.
The Soviet leaders have also been mindful of the fact that at the
peak of the last war the United States produced nearly as many air­
planes, tanks, guns and other war materiel as the rest of the world
combined.
We can be sure that the Soviet leaders have not forgotten 
that fact. But we can also be sure that the Soviet leaders have not 
forgotten that it todk us nearly two and a half years to convert our 
gigantic productive energies from peace to war. 
This time gap in our mobilization is our gravest source of 
peril. It is the weakness around. which any enemy must base its · 
war plans. No nation in the world will attack a mobilized America. 
The only strategy any enemy can have is to attempt to overwhelm 
us during that "too little and too late" period while our military 
power is still "on order." 
That is the reason why I have never ceased urging the 
prompt enactment of a stand-by mobilization plan, which would 
insure the swiftest possible marshalling of. all our resources in case 
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of attack. A ready.:.t.o-go mobilization plan should be put into law 
now, to go into instant operation upon joint proclamation by Con­
gress and the President. To wait until war has begun and bombs 
are actually falling before we begin to legislate is to invite disaster. 
Nor is anything to be gained by delay. What needs to be 
done is as well known today as it ever will be. The question is 
not what should be done, but whether we will do what we know must 
be done, or wait until disaster is upon us. 
Included in this stand-by mobilization law should be: 
An impartial selective service law, with a work-or-fight 
clause. 
A readied civilian defense. 
The elimination of profiteering. 
The power to shut down less essential production to give 
military needs priority. 
Rationing of scarce essentials. 
Much higher taxes. 
A ceiling on all prices, rents, wages and other costs to pre­
vent the inflation which could wreck any mobilization. 
These laws would not specify the quantities of weapons to 
be produced-that must be kept secret and be constantly revised. 
Their objective would be to organize the nation so that if war came, 
no time would be lost in meeting any military demands. May I also 
emphasize that the whole program is needed, not merely parts of it . 
. Under political temptation, some may seek to leave prices uncon­
trolled, or . to soften other mobilization measures here and there. 
That was done in the last war, at what a terrible cost not alone in 
inflation but in lengthening the war and with it the slaughtering 
and the maiming ! 
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To sum up there seem to me to be four major essentials 
of. a successful cold war strategy: 
1. A military establishment which includes not only an im­
mediate available striking force of sufficient power to in­
sure prompt retaliation and deter aggression, but one
flexible enough to deal with possible civil war abroad.
2. A ready-to-go mobilization plan which will insure the
swiftest mobilization of all our resources-men, money
and materials-in case we or our allies are attacked.
3. An effective intelligence agency to provide the informa­
tion needed to pace ourselves in relation to the Soviets
and the threat of war.
4. A general staff for peace, to re-evaluate the whole of the
peacewaging and to formulate a global strategy which
will achieve a decision for peace.
One final thought, which I always like to leave with a group 
such as yours. In the past, the American people tended to deny 
the realities of power and to think that peace could be preserved 
by mere moral pronouncements, by "outlawing" war and so on. 
Today, there is general realization that peace is impossible unless 
supported by military strength. Still, although aware of this fact, 
many Americans are uneasy about it. They would like to forget 
their dependence on military power, and so there is much grumbling 
about the so-called "militarization of American life" and of the 
"military running the country". 
Don't let this grumbling disturb you. Yours is the right 
to be proud of your profession. You have brought imperishable 
glory to America. More important, you have never failed this 
country in your role as the guardian and protector of our liberties. 
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What makes" a police state is not the existence of the police 
but the absence of law behind the police. What makes a military 
state is not the existence of the military but that the military con­
stitute themselves the state. The American soldier-and by that 
I mean you naval men as well as the members of the other serv­
ice�has never attempted to be a law unto himself. I resent any 
attempt to force you into a second-class citizenship. I, . for one, 
want, to acknowledge the great debt we all owe you. 
I will close with a quotation from "England's Answer'' by 
Rudyard Kipling. 
"Go to your work and be strong, halting not in your ways, 
, Baulking the end half-won for an instant dole of praise. 
Stand to your work and be wise--certain of sword and pet!, 
Who are neither children nor Gods, but men in a world of men !" 
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